![]() ![]() Je soutiens qu'une stratégie plus efficace consiste à nier la prémisse plus essentielle selon laquelle la relation objet-connaissance est une relation de type pros. Par contre, ces tentatives sont insatisfaisantes, parce que l'argument peut mener à sa conclusion selon laquelle on ne peut connaître les Formes sans s'appuyer sur ce parallélisme. RÉSUMÉ Les tentatives existantes dans la littérature de réfuter l'argument de la plus grande difficulté dans le Parménide ont surtout entrepris de nier le parallélisme entre les relations de type pros entre les Formes et celles entre les particuliers. ) because pros relations require definitional and ontological codependence between the relata, and the knowledge-object relation does not satisfy this reciprocity condition. I argue that a more effective strategy is to deny the more essential premise that the knowledge-object relation is a pros relation. However, these attempts are unsatisfactory, for the argument can reach its conclusion that we cannot know any Forms without relying on this parallelism. ![]() ABSTRACT The extant attempts in the literature to refute the greatest difficulty argument in the Parmenides have focused on denying the parallelism between the pros relations among Forms and those among particulars. ![]()
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